THE CORROSION OF STATES' NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

Sovereignty cannot be approached as an absolute political or legal notion. In the context of globalization processes that take place at regional and local level through integration, states accept the restriction of their freedom of action and, ultimately, their own internal and external political autonomy. If the legal dimensions of sovereignty are relatively determined, its political aspects are less defined. In reality, the concept of sovereignty affirms legal equality and political independence of states. Integration processes on the European continent affect the sovereignty of the state and freedom of action at external side by surrendering national prerogatives to supranational structures and international organizations.

Keywords: state, sovereignty, regionalization, integration, political institutions, national interest, the European Union (EU), independence

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Introduction. The end of bipolarity in international relations reinforced the role of international structures and affected the importance of the state. The state remains an actor in international relations, but with a limited number of competencies. As a legal-political entity, the European Union does not constitute what a state is, possibly a complex state in the classical sense of the term (federation or confederation). But it is not an international (intergovernmental) organization. It is less than a state entity and more than the international organization; and more
precisely it is said to have elements from both the first and the second. [4, pp. 65-75] The EU cannot be placed in any of the existing or known patterns so far, being a sui generis institution, an atypical and new actor in contemporary international society.

In a general opinion, the EU is at least the first in the category of international organizations with their typology. It is an association of states, made for a specific purpose, constituted in a distinct and independent entity by the states that make it up - with its own legal order, established on the basis of a multilateral international treaty - its constitutive act, has its own organized bodies in a certain organization and functioning structure, and which has been given legal personality.

**Methods and applied material.** But the EU is not an international organization in the classical sense of the concept - an intergovernmental one. It is a supra-state organization, with substantial elements of supra-statehood, of unknown scale so far and changing its essence of the association of states, even if the institutional framework in which it was transposed is one of an international organization; supra-statality is given by the pooling of sovereigns - by transferring the sovereignty attributes from states to the EU, to their merging, and by the nature and content of the relations it has with its member states (with which it shares the attributes of sovereignty - by making acts of governing society and replacing them), as well as with third states (becoming a partner in relations with them instead of the states they represent). But the EU also includes some specific elements that the unions of states (confederations and federations) have. [2, p. 98]

As a result, the EU is more than a mere association of states - which is the international organization, forming a structure similar to that of a union of states, with elements that we find either in a federation, or in a confederation, but which cannot be identified as such; based on the system of an international organization, the EU aims to integrate societies from participating States into a single economic, social, political and legal space; it is constituted and functions in its own system, given the “creation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”; it establishes an internal market, an economic union. The relationship between the EU and its Member States is designed to take into account the ultimate goal it has, and for that, the Union is endowed with legal personality and having “competences” to achieve their common goals.
this, the EU has a structure and competencies similar to those of organizations (because there is no other legal entity than it was accepted at that time), but in its content, its elements remind us of a system of states’ grouping. There is a sharing of authority and governance between the EU and its Member States; they participate in EU activity and decide on the role, including its existence, but their participation is reduced in the communitarised segment. The EU has legal personality, possesses a certain legal capacity that is necessary and has its own legal order; it outlines its identity on the international stage, and asserts its values and interests. It has its own operating structure according to the suggested purpose; as a legal subject, the EU maintains relations with states and other international legal subjects, concludes treaties, participates in international life, conducts a wide range of external actions, a common foreign and security policy, etc. Another pillar of legal sovereignty is the equality of rights of states in international relations, introduced by Vattel through Le droit de gens, first published in 1758.

**Achieved results and discussions.** European integration is a gradual process of a sectorial nature, since the Member States have assumed their responsibilities as a permanent member with the aim of gaining momentum and entanglement following accession. This always implies transfers of competences from states to supranational bodies / authorities, and their authority is becoming more and more powerful. “Integration is not only a simple exercise of joint performance of power but it goes much further, aiming at the fundamental restructuring of society and attitudes”. [1, pp. 236-238] However, this controversy is overcome nowadays. Indeed, until after the Second World War, being defined as the supreme state of power, national sovereignty was necessarily unique, absolute, and therefore indivisible (because of the impossibility of having more supreme powers simultaneously). In this situation, any harm to sovereignty is equivalent to its disappearance. It must be understood, however, that sovereignty is neither an immutable legal institution, nor absolute power. Naturally, sovereignty is an evolutionary notion, its evolution accompanying that of the entities it designates. Therefore, sovereignty must now be regarded as divisible, allowing the transfer of competences to an international (or supranational) organization or institution. It undergoes profound mutations in the context of European integration, without losing its role.

As Le Galés draws attention, the transformations that the state goes
through with Europeanization, an acute process of internal differentiation and fragmentation, does not mean the weakening of the state, and its re-modeling must not be confused with the flaw of authority it holds. Even if it assumes that the state maintains its functions of “high policy” in the field of defense and foreign policy, these functions also change their essence. On the one hand, global terrorism can no longer be countered with classical military means, and its combating increasingly emphasizes international collaboration. As regards the relationship between popular sovereignty, national sovereignty and state sovereignty, one can first notice that the way in which the respective syntaxes are used both in constitutional texts and in doctrine is most often a sign of equality between the first two - “sovereignty of the people” and “national sovereignty” - sometimes all three being considered synonymous. Under these circumstances, a discussion of the above-mentioned distinctions appears to be necessary, without hoping, however, that our conclusion will be unanimous. [5, p. 265]

Even if the theory of popular sovereignty and the theory of national sovereignty have special consequences such as voting, ruling, revocation of mandate, forms of democracy, etc., it is generally accepted that the differences between them have diminished as universal voting has been introduced, the distinction between monarchs and republics has nothing to do with the political regime, the forms of direct or semi-direct democracy can also be found alongside of representative democracy. A retrospective reminds us that the idea of a US federation launched at the beginning of the XXth century failed precisely because the predicted system could not be achieved without seriously damaging state sovereignty as it was then conceived. Under these circumstances, the project set out in the statement made by Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in Paris on May 9, 1950, renewed the way to address the issue of European construction, in fact expressing Jean Monnet’s idea, his spiritual father: European construction cannot be achieved at once, but over time, by sector. As Professor Guy Issac says of the Shuman plan, which, in his view, was just a simple method of restoring stability and order in the “center” of the earth. [11]

This transposed project has in fact triggered an economic integration by sectors. The practice of European collaboration and integration, however, went exactly in the direction desired by dreamers and designers of a European federation, which has been facilitated without
any hesitation and doubts. The time elapsed since then worked in two directions, one of which reflects the other:

1) progressive practical achievements in the field of economic integration, which made integration in other areas including the political one possible

2) ideas, concepts of state sovereignty, which have changed for half a century - sharply from one state to another - in favor of limiting the decision-making power of states to the benefit or profit of bodies created by integration, thus limiting sovereignty.

We notice that what seemed shocking immediately after the Second World War became a reality over the years, a normative reality produced by political practice, negotiations between the European states and a reality of the practical functioning of the Community institutions, whose decisions become mandatory for the Member states both de jure and de facto. It is the reality of jointly exercising sovereignty attributes by national states and community structures created by integration, generally regarded as a limitation of sovereignty, a fact unacceptable when the Council of Europe was created as a simple cooperation mechanism between sovereign states. An idea admitted gradually, mostly after 1986, is reflected in the new constitutional texts, which express, in a special way from one state to another, a new conception of state sovereignty. This conception brings together two imperatives, which seem contradictory at a first glance, to one coherent element:

1) the existence of states as distinct, sovereign entities within the EU
2) the stand-alone existence of the EU with its own decision-making power.

Gradually and conditionally, the necessity of limiting the sovereign power of the integrated states (the delegation of sovereign powers, the joint exercise of state sovereign powers, etc.), new rules emerged in the constitutions of many EU states, which directly or indirectly, precisely consider this issue. [3, pp. 3-7] An overview of the fundamental laws of the fifteen countries that are part of the EU highlights the fact that only four do not include references to sovereignty under the conditions of European integration, the others laying down rules in this respect. With regard to the latter, it should be noted that in some we encounter express (direct) references, stating, as the case may be, that the state can transfer some attributes of sovereignty (some competencies) to the European institutions or accept their joint exercise. We even encounter the categorical claim of limiting state sovereignty. In others, regulating how to integrate
into the EU, how to ratify treaties in this area, participating in the constitution of community institutions, etc., they indirectly admit the idea of jointly exercising the sovereign attributes of national states. [11]

In constitutions containing texts on state sovereignty in the conditions of EU integration, the way of regulation and the terminology used differs from one state to another, reflecting, in our opinion, a nuance in the position the state takes on the issue of limiting sovereignty. We will therefore encounter syntagms, “transfer of sovereignty”, “delegation of sovereignty”, “transfer of competences”, etc. We will also meet the recognition of the “limitation of the state’s sovereignty” necessary for integration, the categorical assertion that “the powers necessary for the construction of the EU will be exercised in common or the possibility of entrusting the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers to some international law institutions. Finally, there are constitutions that provide for “giving up the decision-making power” of national bodies in favor of the community, under certain conditions. If such constitutions contain express references to the “state” of state sovereignty in the conditions of European integration, there are no such norms in other fundamental laws, but from the interpretation of the texts, the position of the respective state can be liberalized in the issue of the division of sovereignty competences (or their exercise) between EU and national institutions.

By going through the constitutional texts to which we have referred, we will observe, besides the diversity of positions adopted by states regarding national sovereignty under the conditions of European integration, a common concern for firmly embedding the conditions in which states accept the idea of jointly exercising their attributes or limiting sovereignty. Thus, for example, in the Basic Law of Germany, after the principle of the “transfer of sovereignty rights” is stated, Article 23 states the ways for its fulfillment - the adoption of a law by the Bundesrat with the revision of the Constitution [7], as well as the conditions under which the federation’s institutions can compete to achieve EU tasks. In the Constitution of Denmark (art. 20), recognizing the possibility of delegating the powers that belong to the national bodies to international authorities, there are also conditions, among which we will remember as essential ones. These are the idea of limiting this possibility and the idea of delegation, a law voted with 5/6 of the number of deputies, so with a procedure as complicated as the revision of the constitution. In this respect, it is stated that the
delegation can only be done “to an extent that has to be determined, so specified by law, to better meet the limits in which the state may renounce the exercise of sovereign attributes.

A similar concern arises from the texts of Title XV of the French Constitution, where the condition of reciprocity is introduced, a condition that we encounter in other fundamental laws, as in Italy (art. 11) and in Portugal (art. 7, paragraph 6). Thus, Article 88-1 states that “the Republic participates in the European Communities and the EU, constituted by states that have freely decided, by virtue of the treaties they have concluded, to jointly exercise some of their competences” (s.n.). Article 88-2 states that France shall, subject to reciprocity and in accordance with the EU Treaty, “consent to the transfer of competences necessary for the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union” and the adoption of rules on the free movement of persons and other related areas. In other fundamental laws, the conditions of “transferring” power or “giving up” the power of decision-making of states in favor of the European Communities are even more robust or detailed.

Finally, the Constitution of Portugal states that [8]:

1) in the case of a decision-making process concerning the assignment, the measures taken in this case must comply with the organic law procedure or be approved by 5/6 votes and 3/4 members

2) in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 1 (waiving of decision-making power), the Riksdag may take the decision to surrender the judicial and administrative duties which are not directly based on the Constitution, to other state or international organization, by 3 /4 votes if the attribution to which the state waives involves “the exercise of authority”.

Analyzing the above texts, we first note the concern that the Swedish Constitution regulated, on the one hand, the parliamentary power to give up the power of decision in certain areas, making a limited list of situations in which that power cannot be surrendered, and, on the other hand, its competence to surrender certain tasks in the administrative and judicial fields. If in some fundamental laws, the state sovereignty issue is regulated in the conditions of European integration, in others it is made clear that the exercise of certain attributions reserved by the constitution to the legislative, executive and judicial powers can be temporarily entrusted to some international law institutions (art. 49 of the Luxembourg Constitution).
Finally, given that the treaties establishing the European Communities and then the EU contain precise rules on the attributions of the European institutions and the binding nature of the acts they adopt for the Member States (establishing the precise framework for the relations between these countries and the EU) in some constitutions there is no direct reference to state sovereignty under the conditions of integration, and it is done in another way. For example, the Constitution of Ireland expressly states that the state can ratify the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, etc. In our opinion, such a process presents the disadvantage of requiring repeated revisions, whenever the state has to adhere to a new treaty. [17] From the analysis of the cited texts one can easily find one thing: no matter how the problem of the relations between the EU and each member state was solved, in terms of legal regulation, namely the problem of exercising attributions related to the state’s sovereignty by the Community institutions, in all of these countries, the idea of limiting sovereignty was accepted in one way or another, as this category was understood in the classical doctrine of constitutional law. In all these constitutions - in some more than in others - a new conception of state sovereignty is reflected, a conception that makes integration possible, and especially its continuation in depth.

Some constitutions provide for the “transfer of sovereign rights”, while others, as the case may be, “delegation of sovereignty attributes”, “the transfer of sovereignty competences”, “restrictions on the exercise of national sovereignty”, “the transmission of the sovereignty attributes’ exercise”, “jointly exercising sovereign powers”, “giving up the power of decision-making” (sovereign power) and “limiting sovereignty”. To be able to draw a substantiated logical conclusion, returning to the source is inevitable, as the partial considering of the second question is inevitable in the attempt to respond to the first. Let us remember, therefore, that Jean Jacques Rousseau affirmed that sovereignty belongs to the people, the governors being entrusted only with their pursuit, that sovereignty is inalienable, the governors being merely executors of the general will. If we were to impose this truly democratic principle, we would say that the division of sovereignty is not possible, but only the division of its exercise or, to rigor, the alienation (delegation) of exercise of sovereignty attributes. This view is, as we have seen, reflected in some constitutional texts. [9] Moreover, in some constitutions, it can
only be “temporary”, thus making it possible to alienate the exercise of certain attributes of sovereignty.

Let us also remember that, in the theory of national sovereignty, the people appear as an abstract entity - “the nation” - which is a moral person distinct from the individuals who compose it, with its own will. Beyond the differences between these two theories - popular sovereignty and national sovereignty - and especially those on the nature of the parliamentary mandate - representative or imperative, as the case may be - we hold on to an important issue for the matter that interests us: both consider inalienable sovereignty. In these circumstances, the conclusion that is needed is that, in the case of the states integrated into the European Union, we cannot speak of the “sharing of sovereignty”, although the idea is encountered relatively frequently, but we can speak of - 1) the delegation of powers to exercise certain attributions of sovereignty of the Member States, or 2) their joint exercise with the institutions of the European Union. The sovereign rights of the states, the nations, which are ultimately the author of the European constitutions, cannot be alienated. In this respect, we need to specify that the one who can adopt a constitution may at the same time amend or abrogate it. Referring to the constitutions of national states, the father of the popular sovereignty doctrine admitted the revision, saying it is against the nature of the social body to impose laws that it cannot revoke. However, he said, it is neither against nature nor against reason that he can revoke these laws with the same solemnity he has established. Therefore, it seems right for us, at least theoretically, to admit that the integrated states remain the holders of the right of sovereignty.

Asserting the idea that the happiest “formulations” are those already mentioned and which essentially rely on the distinction between the “right of sovereignty” and the “exercise” of this right, only the latter being estranged, we would like to make a point, namely on the special nature of certain tasks belonging to the institutions of the European Union. It is about those competencies that are specific to political entities that are born through the integration of national states and which are not taken up - even as “exertion” - from them. Exclusive competences of the European Union are determined by other functional requirements than those that led to the formation of national states. In the light of what has been said, we could distinguish between three situations:
1) the one in which the European Union carries out tasks as a result of the alienation of sovereignty exercise by the Member States;

2) the one in which the European Union exercises some sovereign powers with the Member States;

3) the one in which the European Union exercises specific attributions that are not normally met in the national states. [13]

Regarding “the relationship between the categories of “sovereignty of the people”, “national sovereignty” and “state sovereignty” - first reference should be made to the two theories, namely the sovereignty of the people and national sovereignty, which we have done above, only in general terms. Secondly, we must see the constitutional texts. Considering sovereignty, we observe that in almost all constitutions we meet the principle of the sovereignty of the people or, as the case may be, of national sovereignty or both (but in a confused form), whereas the principle of state sovereignty, in the form of a “categorical assertion”, we meet only in two of the fifteen constitutions: in the Constitution of Finland, in the preamble and in art. 1, and in the Constitution of Ireland, in Article 5. Other two fundamental laws - of Luxembourg and of Portugal - enshrine only “external sovereignty”, asserting the independence of the two states. Without any hesitation and doubts, it cannot but be inferred from the economics of the texts of the other constitutions, which entrust the state bodies with all the powers - to make laws, to execute them and to apply them through the settlement of litigations - we definitely have to deal with sovereign states. [14]

EU Member States are in a dual position in the international community: the first comes from the status of EU Member State, which is a special quality - exceptional, and the second, that stems from the membership of the international community - a general, usual one. As a result, their ambivalent status, at the same time, relates to the two distinct legal orders - Community and international, but the priority belongs to the Community one (lex specialis derogat generali) and is outlined as such. In fact, as the EU is constituted and operates in accordance with the rules of international law, the status of the Member States is constantly related to them. Nevertheless, the Member States are not only participating in the EU or in a bilateral relationship with it; participation is much more, because each is part of the EU, (the competence of the EU is exercised over the territory of the participating states - article 49 C). EU foreign policy is the summation (totality) of
the foreign policy of the transformed / reformulated Member States to get into the pattern of an international organization.

If we take into account the broad scope of the EU’s foreign policy, “Common Foreign and Security Policy competence includes all areas of foreign policy as well as EU security issues, including the gradual definition of a defense policy” - Article 11 paragraph [18, pp. 136-140]. The policy, which is at the same time of its Member States, also engaging them, and that in their foreign policy Member States can only engage in actions which are not incompatible with this EU foreign policy (being obliged to refrain from any measure which would jeopardize the achievement of the Union’s objectives - Article 3a). It appears as obviously as possible that there is a reduction in the scope of the foreign policy relations they may have with non-EU countries, relations with the EU being the most important segment of the foreign policy of these states, only in their direct links with other states of the world. The status of the EU Member States ceases to be a general and unitary one. The first is their position vis-à-vis the EU and the other, in relation to the international community as a whole, even though in both assumptions within the EU, as a whole, they are bound to respect the rules of international law. These distinct posts also lead to a hierarchy of the importance of the relations they have - priority is given to community relations [19, pp. 389-392].

As an EU Member State, each is organically linked by the Union and the other Member States. Relations with the European family (the Union and the Member States) are paramount. Together, they are part of the EU structure, have special relations (extensive, profound, preferential and governed by EU rules), and this is clearly reflected in the commitments it assumes and the volume of relations between them (not only between states, but also at the level of their citizens). Transferring sovereignty attributes to the EU - governance, imparting within this structure of the Member States, leads to the establishment of certain relations that are of a special nature - an associative one, with reciprocal arrangements to strengthen relations between them. The limitation of their actions is given by a dual coordinate - they result from the requirement of respecting both the rules of international law (as members of the international community) and those of the EU (as members of the EU). The set of obligations and links makes this category of relations have a special status regime (compared to federated states in a federation).
In the matter of relations with non-EU Member States, the Member States of the EU as a whole, like any other state, is a member of the international community and is bound to respect the rules of international law, but with a predetermined condition, that stems from membership of the EU. As a result, with the other states, they will have, by way of disposal, only those relations which have not been rewarded by the EU and only to the extent that they are compatible with its position as a Member State. They will not be able to conclude any treaty with these states (those which fall within the competence of the EU are excluded, and the others must not be incompatible with Community rules and provision is made for procedures in the event of incompatibility between treaties). Romania has been forced to review a series of agreements - economic ones - to take into account EU membership. They may have relations with any other state, but must take into account its obligations under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy; positions vis-à-vis another state agreed in the EU are also those of the Member States; participation in international organizations is marked by the obligation of a certain behavior, etc. [15]

The functions of the diplomatic missions of the Member States are adapted to the fact that the EU has its own policy on relations, and this policy also belongs to the Member States; persons with European citizenship are entitled to diplomatic protection from other States other than their own state. To the extent that no common policy has been agreed upon in a matter, each Member State is free to adopt its own position: in the issue of Kosovo’s recognition, each State has adopted its own position; the fact that the “progressive design of a common defense policy” is envisaged does not exclude the possibility for a Member State to have its own defense policy (“does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States” - art. 28 A) and, we add, that this cannot only be about the NATO alliance but about another military alliance. The way the EU’s mechanisms are designed and will work, confirms the role of the Member States’ foreign ministries: the Common Foreign and Security Policy is implemented by the High Representative and the Member States, using the national and Union means (Article 12 paragraph 3); The External Service for Foreign Policy - led by the High Representative, cooperates with the diplomatic services of the Member States, including seconded staff of
national diplomatic services (Article 13a); The High Representative and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States coordinate their activities within the Council (Article 16); The European Defense Agency - under the authority of the Council, is open to all Member States (Article 28 D) and so on. [6, p. 20]

As regards the relationship between popular sovereignty, national sovereignty and state sovereignty, one can first notice that the way in which the respective syntaxes are used both in constitutional texts and in doctrine is most often a sign of equality between the first two - “sovereignty of the people” and “national sovereignty”, sometimes all three being considered synonymous. Under these circumstances, a discussion of the above-mentioned distinctions appears to be necessary, without hoping, however, that our conclusions will be unanimous. Even if the theory of popular sovereignty and the theory of national sovereignty have special consequences such as voting, ruling, revocation of mandate, forms of democracy, etc., it is generally accepted that the differences between them have diminished as universal voting has been introduced, the distinction between monarchs and republics has nothing to do with the political regime, the forms of direct or semi-direct democracy can also be found alongside of representative democracy. [12]

Regarding state sovereignty, we believe that we must start from the observation that in the specialized language, as in the common language, the notion of state is used concurrently in two ways: in a broad sense, “an organized society having an autonomous government” and in a narrow sense, an organizational system that manages the sovereign leadership of a society (of a population stabilized on a certain territory), holding for this purpose both the monopoly of creation and the monopoly of the application of the law. If the notion of state is used in a broad sense, there is no question of the relationship between the three syntagms unless we admit that we can generally signify equality (at least equality of situations) between the sovereignty of the people and national sovereignty. If, however, we use the notion of state in a narrow sense, we will need to clarify who the “sovereign” is, the people or the organizational system that is leading it. In this respect, however, we can resort to constitutional texts. De jure, “all powers come from the nation, from the people”. The political institutions in their entirety - as a state in a narrow sense - are sovereign if they are legitimate, if they respect the status of the nation,
that is, the constitution. As soon as the rules of the political game are brutally violated, the people manifest themselves as sovereign; the “apparatus” leading them may be removed. At such a crossroads - as for example in December 1989 in Romania - the transition from one state to another, from one political regime to another, is, of course, the sovereign manifestation of the will of the people. The respective state, as the holder of sovereignty, disappears. Another one comes to take its place. But the people ... remain. “Our beautiful ideas of sovereignty as far as the truth is concerned” - we must admit that it is more rhetorical, because there is no government and there is no constitution in which the sovereignty of the people, as the case may be, of the nation is not asserted. In this regard, we must make it clear that all or most of the Member States of the European Union have been concerned about the fate of “state sovereignty” under the conditions of integration, and the new constitutional rules may be interpreted in this respect, while Community documents do not reflect such concern, referring in particular to the “national identity” of the Member States and not to the sovereignty of the State.

If we admit - and we believe we have to do this - that the principle of the sovereignty of the people must be the basis of all “political constructions” - from the lowest to the level of the institutions of the European Union, then it must be accounted for in the light of at least three requirements:

1) creating staged organizational forms or integrating aptly expressed states and translating as faithfully as possible the will of the people or peoples of the integrated states,

2) creating and improving existing forms of representation so that it is as faithful as possible;

3) recognizing the right of the people, peoples, in the case of steady integration, to intervene in the ways of direct or semi-direct democracy in the key issues of the nation or of the integrated nations. [16]

We conclude from the current practice of both the European Union and the Council of Europe, that the “globalization” of human rights, on the one hand, and the limitation of the “rights” of the state, its powers, on the other hand are imposed on us. However, this constraint must first be seen as a consequence of the sovereign manifestation of the European Union’s will, which is the only way to achieve and improve integration in as many fields as possible. Secondly, if we do not lose sight of the fact that “any power comes from the people, from the na-
tion”, we will have to ignore the phenomenon we are talking about, not as a sharing of state sovereignty, nor as its limitation, but in another way, which in our opinion holds the dignity of the peoples and the truth. Everything that has been and will be perfected in terms of European integration implies the joint exercise of the attributes of state sovereignty and the exercise of such attributes by the institutions of the European Union as a result of their delegation by the national states. In this way, we assert the truth: the integrated nations remain sovereign; they will decide whether to advance on the path of integration to federalization or whether they will act in a different sense. “Sovereignty” is a natural right. It is an impregnable and inalienable right. This right may be “temporarily” confiscated, but the holder may at any time claim it.

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